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Everywhere in the industrialized world, population aging is putting social security systems
under ﬁnancial strain. As a result, social security systems are being reformed in many
countries. In particular, various countries move from pure pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems
to pension systems that include a larger funded component. At the same time, deﬁned-
beneﬁt systems in which beneﬁts are guaranteed by public or corporate sponsors are being
replaced by deﬁned-contribution systems in which beneﬁts are subject to various risks.1
This paper explores how diﬀerent pension systems aﬀect the intergenerational sharing
of risks and how they can help to share these risks optimally over generations.2 To that
end, we formulate a model in which a young and an old generation live under the same
government and overlap during one period. The economy is subject to three sources
of shocks: productivity, depreciation of capital and inﬂation. We consider two-pillar
pension systems, with a PAYG ﬁrst pillar and a funded second pillar, which may be of
the DC type or various DB types. A number of papers have studied how pension systems
aﬀect intergenerational risk sharing but most of them focus on risk sharing within PAYG
systems only — see, for example, Hassler and Lindbeck (1997), Thogersen (1998), Krueger
and Kubler (2002), and Wagener (2004). Bohn (2003) investigates intergenerational risk
sharing, but he does not study the implications of various types of funded pension systems
in this regard.
The key feature of our setup is that ﬁnancial markets are incomplete for two reasons.
The ﬁrst reason is that generations cannot trade with each other before the shocks hit the
economy, because the young generation is born only after these shocks have materialized.
The other reason for market incompleteness is that human capital is not traded, so that
the old generation cannot acquire a claim on human capital and in this way share in the
wage risk faced by the young generation.3 As a result of these two sources of market
incompleteness, the portfolio choices of the pension fund and the closure rule for the
government budget constraint do have real eﬀects: the two generations cannot fully oﬀset
the transactions of the pension fund and the government. While a deﬁned-contribution
second pillar does not add anything to the transaction possibilities in ﬁnancial markets and
thus leaves allocations unaﬀected, deﬁned-beneﬁt pension funds create new opportunities
for intergenerational risk sharing that private agents do not oﬀset through transactions in
ﬁnancial markets. The reason for these new risk-sharing possibilities oﬀered by deﬁned-
1For descriptions of pension reforms in the European Union, see EPC (2006).
2For early work on intergenerational risk sharing and social security, see Enders and Lapan (1982)
and Gordon and Varian (1988). More recent contributions include a.o. Demange (2002), De Menil and
Sheshinski (2003) and Gottardi and Kubler (2006). For broader recent perspectives, see Shiller, 1999,
and Lindbeck and Persson, 2003.
3These two sources of market incompleteness are closely related under an alternative interpretation
of the reason why the young generation cannot participate in the ﬁnancial market. This alternative
interpretation is that the young cannot borrow against their human capital to invest in ﬁnancial capital
(see also Constantinides et al., 2002, and Carroll et al., 2005). This short-selling constraint of the young
originates also in the lack of tradability of human capital.
1beneﬁt pensions is that when funded pension beneﬁts are deﬁned independently from
ex-post returns on ﬁnancial assets, the young generation becomes the residual claimant
of the assets of the fund and thus shares in the risks associated with the ﬁnancial returns
on these capital assets (see also Modigliani and Muralidhar, 2004). Moreover, by linking
beneﬁts to wages, the old acquire an implicit claim on human capital. In eﬀect, by not
matching the risks of its liabilities with the risks in assets, a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension fund
allows the young generation to exchange human capital risks and ﬁnancial risks with the
old generation, thereby reducing market incompleteness.
We consider three types of deﬁned-beneﬁts y s t e m s .T h eﬁr s ti sw h e nt h eb e n e ﬁtp a i d
out to the old is deﬁned in nominal terms, the second is when this beneﬁti sd e ﬁned in
real terms and the ﬁn a ls y s t e ma s s u m e st h a tt h eb e n e ﬁt is indexed to wages. These three
alternative systems imply that the young sell, respectively, nominal debt, real debt or
wage-indexed debt to the old generation and invest the fund’s capital for their own risk
in assets that the pension fund buys on ﬁnancial markets.
The key question is whether the pension system allows for optimal intergenerational
risk sharing in a decentralized market economy in which incomplete ﬁnancial markets
prevent generations from trading all risks. We ﬁnd that optimal intergenerational risk
sharing and optimal intergenerational redistribution is achieved with a combination of a
ﬁrst pillar PAYG pension system and a second pillar deﬁned-beneﬁt pension fund with
restrictions on its portfolio and the way beneﬁts are deﬁned and thus respond to risks.
While the ﬁrst pillar aims at systematic redistribution between generations in accordance
w i t ht h er e l a t i v es o c i a lp r e f e r e n c ew e i g h tg i v e nt ot h eo l da n dy o u n gg e n e r a t i o n ,t h e
second pillar allows for optimal sharing of ﬁnancial-market and inﬂation risk between the
generations.4 In particular, the pension fund should invest in equity and nominal bonds
to implement the optimal exposures of the generations to capital risks and inﬂation risks.
Both pillars can optimally share wage risks by linking pension beneﬁts to wages. If the
funded beneﬁts can be linked to wages, the ﬁrst, PAYG pillar can be targetted exclusively
at optimal ex ante redistribution, while the second, funded pillar is responsible for optimal
risk sharing.
The optimal pension arrangement ensures that each individual has the same exposure
to aggregate depreciation and productivity risks by having the same implicit ownership
share of the aggregate capital stock as the same implicit share of aggregate human capital.
The actual magnitude of this optimal ownership share depends on the social preference
weight and risk aversion. Inﬂation risk, in contrast, is no aggregate risk and can be
completely eliminated. If the relative social preference weight attached to the old and
young generation is equal and both generations feature the same relative risk aversion,
both generations should have identical eﬀective holdings of physical and human capital
and nominal assets. If the social preference weight on the young generation is largest and
4The second pillar is fully funded in the sense that, from an ex-ante perspective (i.e., on average), the
old generation does not receive any resources through this pillar (see also Oksanen, 2006).
2relative risk aversion is uniform across the population, the eﬀective holding of human and
physical capital of the young should be larger, so that they are more exposed to productiv-
ity and depreciation risks. Since aggregate inﬂation risk is zero and both generations pay
the same tax share, nominal assets holdings should be eﬀectively identical across individ-
uals, thereby eleminating the inﬂation risk for each individual. The requirement that the
exposure to inﬂation risk be equalized across generations makes deﬁned beneﬁts y s t e m s
in which beneﬁts are deﬁned in nominal terms unattractive. With such a pension system,
the existing long position of the old generation in nominal bonds becomes even longer
and their exposure to inﬂation risk becomes larger. As a result, the fund would need to
invest more than its initial value in nominal debt and go short in real debt in order the
eﬀectively equalize the nominal exposures of the two generations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
solves for the social planner’s solution, which thus prescribes optimal intergenerational
risk sharing and redistribution. Section 3 presents the decentralized economy, while Sec-
tion 4 loglinearizes the conditions determining the solution for the decentralized economy.
Section 5 analyses the laissez-faire economy in the presence of incomplete ﬁnancial mar-
kets and the absence of pension arrangements. Section 6 introduces the various possible
pension arrangements. This sets the stage for the normative analysis in Section 7, which
investigates under what pension arrangements the market economy is able to replicate
the social optimum. Finally, Section 8 concludes the main body of this paper. Appendix
Ac o n t a i n ss o m ed e ﬁnitions. All technical details are found in the Appendices B - E.
These appendices are not for publication, but will be made available via the web or can
be obtained directly from the authors.
2 The command economy
2.1 Individuals and preferences
The model represents a closed economy. It incorporates three periods (t − 1,tand t +1 )
and two generations who each live for two periods. In period t − 1, a generation of mass
1 − δ>0 is born. This generation lives through periods t − 1 and t.W e c a l l t h i s
generation the “old generation.” The representative agent within this generation features
the following utility functon:
U (cy,t−1,c ot)=u(cy,t−1)+βEt−1 [u(cot)], (1)
where cy,t−1 denotes consumption when this agent is young, while cot represents consump-
tion when the agent is old. In period t, a new generation of mass δ>0 is born. This
generation features the same utility function U (cyt,c o,t+1),b u tn o wd e ﬁned over young
consumption in period t, cyt, and old consumption in period t+1,c o,t+1.T h i sg e n e r a t i o n
is termed the “young generation”. At the end of period t+1, the model ends. The lives of
t h et w og e n e r a t i o n st h u so v e r l a pi np e r i o dt. The total population in that period is unity.
32.2 Production
The output levels of the single good in periods t − 1 and t +1are exogenously given at
per-capita levels ηt−1 and ηt+1 (i.e. measured per person who is alive in the respective
period). Production is endogenous only in period t, when the two generations co-exist,
a n di st h e ng i v e nb y
Yt = AtF (Kt,L t), (2)
where Kt represents the aggregate capital stock and Lt aggregate employment. At denotes
total factor productivity (TFP), which is stochastic. The production function exhibits
constant returns to scale. In our closed economy, the capital stock Kt is the result of
investment in the previous period t−1. The old generation is retired in period t, while each
young individual exogenously supplies an amount of labor ¯ N in that period. Aggregate
employment thus amounts to ¯ L ≡ δ ¯ N.
2.3 Public expenditures and resource constraints
Exogenous public spending in periods t−1 and t is given by gt−1 and gt, respectively. We
introduce public spending in order to have a role for taxes and public debt in the market
economy to be studied below. For convenience, public spending does not enter the utility
functions of private agents. With public spending exogenous, this assumption is of no
consequence, though.
The resource constraints in periods t − 1,tand t +1are given by, respectively,
(1 − δ)cy,t−1 =( 1 − δ)ηt−1 − Kt − gt−1, (3)




+( 1− ζt)Kt − gt, (4)
δco,t+1 = δηt+1, (5)
where 0 ≤ ζt ≤ 1 is the stochastic depreciation rate of the capital shock. Uncertainty
in the depreciation rate may arise from (unexpected) changes in relative prices causing
changes in the value of capital, disasters aﬀecting the amount of capital that can be trans-
formed back into consumption goods, etcetera. The left-hand sides of these expressions
denote aggregate consumption in the economy. The right-hand side of (3) represents to-
tal endowment income minus the investment in physical capital and public expenditures.
The right-hand side of (4) stands for total production minus total public expenditures
but plus what is left over of the capital stock after taking into account depreciation. At
the aggregate level, no storage technology is available to transfer resources from period t
into period t+1. Hence, consumption outlays in period t+1are constrained by the total
endowment in that period.
42.4 The social planner’s solution
The vector of the stochastic shocks in the command economy is ξ
s
t ≡ {At,ζt}.I t i s
unknown in period t−1, but becomes known before period t variables are determined. In
periodt−1, the social planner commits to a state-contingent plan. Hence, the consumption
levels in period t are functions of the shocks: cot = cot (ξ
s
t) and cyt = cyt(ξ
s
t).
The planner weighs all individuals in a generation equally and aims to maximize the
sum of the discounted expected utilities of the current and future generations’ individuals,
where the relative weight of the individuals born in t is given by χp > 0. By varying χp,
we can map out all Pareto optimal solutions.
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t) stands for the probability density function for the vector of stochastic shocks
ξ
s
t. The Lagrange multipliers for the resource constraints in period t−1 and t are denoted
by λt−1 and λt (ξ
s
t), respectively. Maximization of the planner’s program with respect to
cy,t−1, Kt,c yt(ξ
s
t), and cot (ξ
s
t) for all ξ
s
































where the ﬁrst-order derivative of u(.) is denoted by a subscript “c”, FKt stands for
the marginal product of capital (suppressing the arguments of the function) and rkn
t ≡
AtFKt−ζt, which in the sequel we will refer to as the net-of-depreciation return on capital.














If a decentralized equilibrium is to replicate the planner’s solution, these optimality con-
ditions need to be met in addition to the resource constraints (3) and (4).
2.5 Loglinearization of the social planner’s solution
For future use, we loglinearize the planner’s system of ﬁrst-order conditions (6) and (7).
We do this in two steps. First, we set up the system when all shocks happen to be at their
5expected values (for lack of a better term, we call this the median system). The variables
in this system are denoted with an upperbar.5 Second, we ﬁnd the log-linearized system of
responses to the shocks (we call this the system in logdeviations). The stochastic variables
in the model exhibit lognormal distributions:
lnAt =l nA + ωAt, lnζt =l n¯ ζ + ωζt,
where the shocks ωAt and ωζt are normally distributed with mean zero and respective
variances σ2
A and σ2
ζ. For convenience, we assume that these shocks are all uncorrelated.
The median system is:
χ
puc (¯ cyt)=uc (¯ cot), (8)






1 − ¯ ζ
¢
Kt − gt, (9)
















where φpt, which is deﬁned in Appendix B, has zero mean and is a linear function of the
shocks ωAt and ωζt. This linear function is derived from the system in logdeviations.
That system, obtained after loglinearizing (4) and (6), is given by:





where a hat above a variable denotes a logarithmic deviation from the steady state (e.g.,
b cyt =l n ( cyt/¯ cyt)). Furthermore, acy,a co,a g,a Y and aζ represent the shares of median
young’s consumption, old’s consumption, government spending, production and depre-
ciation in median total resources in period t (see Appendix A for a formal deﬁnition).
Finally, σo ≡− ¯ cotu00 (¯ cot)/u0 (¯ cot) and σy ≡− ¯ cytu00 (¯ cyt)/u0 (¯ cyt) stand for the coeﬃcients
of relative risk aversion for the old and the young, respectively (evaluated at the median
outcome). The solution of the system in logdeviations is derived in Appendix B.
3 The decentralized economy
This section describes the decentralized market economy in which individuals and ﬁrms
maximize their objective functions under the relevant constraints. A key question will
5To emphasize, the “median” variables are the values of the variables when all shocks happen to be
equal to their expected values. Hence, a “median” variable is not necessarily equal to its expected value.
Further, we note that we do not use upperbars for variables that are predetermined at the start of period
t,s u c ha sKt.
6be under what circumstances a market economy can replicate the command optimum.
We note that we can interpret the optimal risk-sharing condition (6) as the condition
for ex-ante trade in risks between the young and the old in complete ﬁnancial markets.
However, in a decentralized economy, the two generations cannot trade risk in ﬁnancial
markets, because the young generation is born only after the shocks have materialized.
Indeed, in the absence of pension arrangements, the old bear all the depreciation risk ωζt
and cannot shift this risk toward the young. Both generations are exposed to production
risk ωAt, but it is unlikely that the allocation of risk across generations is optimal. Hence,
the generations would like to trade this risk but they cannot do this on ﬁnancial markets.
Other institutions thus have to ﬁll the gap of the missing market for risk sharing between
the old and the young generations. We shall explore to what extent the pension system
can perform that role.
We allow for inﬂation in our decentralized economy. Inﬂa t i o ni np e r i o dt is deﬁned
as πt ≡
Pt−Pt−1
Pt−1 ,w h e r ePt is the price level in period t.W e v i e w i n ﬂation as a source
o fr i s k . T h i si st h er e l e v a n tv i e ww h e ni n ﬂation is beyond the control of the domestic
policymakers, for example, when the country is part of a monetary union (like the Euro
area) and monetary policy is thus conducted at a supranational level. Another source for
inﬂation risk is a stochastic link between monetary policy and inﬂation because of velocity
shocks. In any case, inﬂation is assumed to be an exogenous stochastic process, such that
ln(1 + πt) − ln(1 + ¯ πt)=ˆ πt,
is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2
π. Hence, the vector of three risk
factors in the decentralized market economy is ξt ≡ {At,ζt, ˆ πt}.
The timing of events in the market economy is as follows:
1. The “old generation” (i.e., those who are young in period t−1) make their investment
decisions, while the government issues debt to cover its period t − 1 expenditures.
2. The set of shocks ξt materializes.
3. The government levies period-t taxes and issues new debt. At the same time, ﬁrms
take hiring and production decisions, while young individuals decide on their savings.
3.1 Individual budget constraints
The exogenous endowments ηt−1 > 0 and ηt+1 > 0 a r eo w n e db yt h eo l da n dt h ey o u n g ,
respectively, while labor income in period t accrues to the young. The budget constraints
facing the old in periods t − 1 and t and the young in periods t and t +1are thus given
by:











cyt = Ntwt (1 − θ
w
t ) − θ
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t +( 1− ζt)]kt − τt
co,t+1 = ηt+1 +( 1+r
r
t)st − τt+1, (15)
where br
t−1 denotes real (indexed) public debt directly held by households, bn
t−1 is direct
nominal (non-indexed) public debt holdings, kt is the direct claim of households on the
capital stock in period t, θ
f
t−1 is an exogenous mandatory contribution to the pension
fund, Nt i st h ea m o u n to ft i m ew o r k e di np e r i o dt, wt is the real wage per unit of labor
supplied, τt is lump-sum tax payments (levied in equal amounts on both generations) in
period t, θ
p
t is a lump-sum pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security contribution made by
the period-t young and paid out to the old in the same period, θ
w
t Ntwt is a wage-linked
PAYG social security contribution made by the period-t young and paid out to the old
i nt h es a m ep e r i o d( w h e r eθ
w
t is thus the premium rate), st is savings of the young in
period t, r
f
t−1 is the realized real return to the old on their contributions to the funded
pension scheme, ra
t−1 is the average net return on the assets held by the pension funds,
it−1 is the nominal interest rate on nominal public debt determined at the moment of
issuance, rr
t−1 is the real return on indexed debt issued in period t − 1 and is determined
at the moment of issuance, rk
t is the real return per unit of capital in production, rr
t is the
real return on savings in period t and, ﬁnally, τt+1 is lump-sum tax payments in period
t+1(levied only on the young generation). In deriving (14), we have used that the gross
real return in period t on one dollar invested in nominal debt in period t − 1 amounts to











t−1 arises from the possibility that the ex-post payment
















t−1, in which case the young
generation has a residual claim on the pension fund. Given that the number of young is










t−1. This term arises if the
pension fund faces mismatch risk so that the return on the assets ra
t−1 can diﬀer from the
return paid on the pension contributions r
f
t−1.T h ed e ﬁcits or surpluses that may arise as a
consequence of the mismatch accrue to the young generations. In other words, the young
absorb the mismatch risk. The young are thus in fact the owners of the pension fund,
which has certain liabilities (to the old) and assets, such that the liabilities are covered
from an ex-ante point of view (as we shall impose later on).
83.2 Individual and ﬁrm optimization
As is standard, we solve the model by working backwards through the game. A young
person born in period t chooses savings st to maximize its utility, (1), forwarded by one
period, subject to its budget constraints (13) and (15), so that
uc (cyt)=β(1 + r
r
t)uc (co,t+1), (16)
where all uncertainty is resolved when this saving decision is taken.
In period t, a continuum of perfectly competitive representative ﬁrms, with mass nor-
malized to unity, produce according to (2) and maximizes proﬁts
AtF (Kt,L t) − wtLt − r
k
tKt, (17)
over Lt and Kt,t a k i n ga sg i v e nt h ew a g er a t ea n dt h er e n t a lr a t eo fc a p i t a l .T h i sy i e l d s
the following ﬁrst-order conditions:




where AtFLt is the marginal product of labor (suppressing the arguments of the function).
In period t − 1, the old generation decides on the allocation of its savings over the
various assets. They maximize (1) over br
t−1,b n
t−1 and kt,w h e r ecy,t−1 and cot are given by







Et−1 [uc (cot)] = uc (cy,t−1), (20)
















= uc (cy,t−1). (22)
3.3 The government budget constraint
The public budget constraint in period t − 1 reads as:
dt−1 = gt−1, (23)
where dt−1 represents the real value of the aggregate public debt issued in period t − 1.
Without any taxation in that period, it equals the exogenous public expenditures in period
t − 1. The government in period t − 1 issues both nominal debt dn








The shares of the two types of debt are exogenous.













t−1 + gt − dt. (25)
The ﬁrst two terms at the right-hand side of (25) represent the redemption of, respectively,
indexed and nominal public debt (including interest payments). The third term on the
right-hand side is total real government expenditure. The ﬁnal right-hand term subtracts
newly-issued public debt in period t, dt,6 to arrive at the tax ﬁnancing needs of the
government. This new public debt is the only asset available to transfer resources between
periods t and t +1 . The term on the left-hand side represents aggregate lump-sum tax
revenue, which adjusts to maintain the government’s budget balance.




where we have used that the (real) interest rate on the public debt issued in period t is
rr
t.T a x e si np e r i o dt +1 , which are levied only on the young generation, should pay for
the redemption of the public debt plus the interest on the debt.
3.4 Market equilibrium conditions
The goods market equilibrium conditions in periods t − 1,tand t +1are given by (3),
(4) and (5), respectively. Given that the masses of the old and the young generations are
1 − δ and δ, respectively, the factor market equilibria are:






,L t = δNt = δ ¯ N ≡ ¯ L, (27)
where k
f
t denotes the pension fund’s investment in physical capital per old person.W i t ha
total mass of 1−δ individuals in period t−1, equilibrium in both debt markets in period


























t−1 denote the pension fund’s investments in real and nominal debt per
old person. Finally, since the only way to transfer resources between periods t and t +1
is public debt, equilibrium in the market for debt issued in period t requires that:
δst = dt. (29)
Imposing the bond market equilibrium condition (29) on (16) allows us to solve for the
interest rate rr
t on the debt issued in period t. Of course, equilibrium requires that (5)
holds.
6In period t, real and nominal debt are equivalent since inﬂation uncertainty is absent in period t+1.
104 The loglinearized model
For later use, this section log-linearizes the model. The complete system to be loglinearized
consists of the old generation’s ﬁrst-order conditions (20), (21) and (22), consumption of
the old generation in period t − 1:









and consumption of the young and old generations in period t:
cyt = 1
















t are the generational accounts of each young or old person, respectively.
These generational accounts depend on the type of pension system, as we shall see below.












In the same way as we loglinearized the social planner’s solution, we loglinearize the
decentralized solution in two steps. First, we set up the median system when all shocks
happen to be equal to their expected values. Then, we set up the system in logarithmic
deviations (as a result of the exogenous shocks) of variables from their corresponding
values in the median system.
4.1 The median system





































(1 − δ)cy,t−1 =( 1 − δ)ηt−1 − (gt−1 + Kt), (37)
¯ cyt = 1
δ ¯ A¯ LFLt − gt + ¯ G
y
t, (38)













φnt = −ˆ πt − σ
ob cot, (41)




φr ≡ Vart (φrt); σ
2
φn ≡ Vart (φnt); σ
2
φK ≡ Vart (φKt),
where b cot is given below and aKn,a K, and aζ denote the shares of median capital rentals,
overall capital income, and capital depreciation in median resources in period t (see Ap-
pendix A for a formal deﬁnition). This system would need to be solved for rr
t−1, it−1,
cy,t−1, ¯ cyt, ¯ cot and Kt.
4.2 The system in logarithmic deviations






















where aL and aGo stand for the shares of median gross labor income and the median
generational account in median resources in period t (see Appendix A for a formal def-
inition). A positive productivity shock (ωAt > 0) raises consumption of both the young
(through higher wage income) and the old (through higher dividend income). Higher than
expected depreciation reduces the amount of capital left over from production and at given
generational accounts hurts only the old.
5 Laissez-faire: no pension system













t =0 ) , which we call “laissez-faire”. Imposing
these assumptions on (14), using (25) to eliminate τt,( 1 9 )t oe l i m i n a t erk
t (and using
rkn
t = AtFKt − ζt), (27) to eliminate kt (and using k
f
























t−1 + dt, (45)
which we can linearize into (see Appendix D):
b G
o












b dt = b G
y
t.
We substitute this into (43) and (44) to eliminate b Go
t and obtain the ﬁnal solutions for b cyt




































Both the young and the old generation’s consumption increase with positive productivity
shocks (ωAt > 0). A positive inﬂation shock beneﬁts (harms) consumption of the young
(old) generation because it erodes the real value of the outstanding public debt held by
the old, which is in part ﬁnanced by taxes on the young. Finally, depreciation shocks
aﬀect only the old generation. Clearly, only in very special circumstances would b cyt and
b cot co-move in the socially-optimal way prescribed by (11). The laissez-faire economy thus
leaves room for welfare improvements through appropriate risk-sharing mechanisms.
6 The pension system
The pension system consists of two pillars. The ﬁrst pillar is a PAYG system consist-
ing of a lump-sum part and a wage-indexed part. PAYG ﬁnancing implies that total




t Ntwt, equal the aggregate payments to the old,










.W i t h a ﬁxed parameter θ
w
t > 0, the PAYG system is
of the deﬁned-contribution rather than of the deﬁned-beneﬁt type. In this case, pension
beneﬁts are exposed to wage risk because they vary with wage income. Through their
PAYG pensions, the old generations thus bear some of the wage risk.
The second pillar of the pension system is funded rather than PAYG. This means that
the old generation (in expected value) ﬁnances its own pension beneﬁts. In particular,
in period t − 1, each old person contributes an amount θ
f
t−1 into the second pillar. The











The average net return on the assets held by the pension funds ra





























Even though a funded pension system does not redistribute between generations ex
ante, it may help to share shocks ex post between the generations depending on how the
assets and liabilities of the fund respond to shocks. Whereas the funding requirement
demands that the assets and liabilities are equal in value ex ante, the values may diverge
ex post if the shocks aﬀect the assets and liabilities diﬀerently. For the moment, we take
the pension fund’s contribution policy θ
f







given, and consider various types of liabilities of the pension funds.
136.1 The various second-pillar systems
6.1.1 Deﬁned contribution
In a deﬁned-contribution (DC) type of pension fund, the value of the liabilities always
matches that of the assets, not only ex ante but also ex post. Hence, the total pension








t−1, coincide with the actual (gross) returns on
the pension contributions in all states of the world. The risks facing the old thus depend
directly on the investment policy of the fund.7 Indeed, under a DC system, the old are
the residual claimants of the fund. A DC system does not involve the young at all. It thus
does not provide intergenerational risk-sharing opportunities in addition to those already
provided by the capital market.






































δAt¯ LFLt,a n dexplicit public debt (dr
t−1,d n
t−1 and
dt) feature in the generational accounts of the two generations. The beneﬁtt ot h eo l do f
explicit public debt in period t−1 depends on the size of the young generation δ.I fδ =0 ,
all explicit public debt issued in period t−1 must be paid oﬀ by the old generation through
their own tax payments. Hence, public debt does not redistribute across generations. If δ
is close to one, virtually all explicit debt issued in the previous period is paid oﬀ through
the tax payments by the young. For debt issued in period t, the relative sizes of the two
generations are irrelevant, since dt is completely paid oﬀ by the young.
Suppose that we hold constant the government’s debt policies (dn
t−1, dr





t characterizing the pension system’s ﬁr s tp i l l a r .I nt h a tc a s e ,t h e
introduction of a DC funded system does not aﬀect individual consumption decisions.8
Hence, the equilibrium values for rr
t−1,i t−1 and Kt (the latter is one-to-one linked to the
real return on capital) are the same with or without DC funded pension system; in the






t implemented by the
pension fund is oﬀset by an equal reduction in individual holdings of real debt, nominal
debt or capital. This conﬁrms the standard textbook result that a DC pension fund
does not aﬀect the equilibrium as long as individuals can freely participate in the capital
market (e.g., Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, or Heijdra and Van der Ploeg, 2002), extended
to additional instruments. In eﬀect, we arrive at a kind of Modigliani-Miller (or Ricardian
equivalence) neutrality result for pension funds: the ﬁnancing of a DC pension fund does
not aﬀect the equilibrium.
7The DC system can thus guarantee real beneﬁts ex ante by investing in price-indexed bonds. With
the help of the government issuing real bonds, a DC system thus allows for deﬁned beneﬁts.
8Computational details and the solution of decentralized economy model with pensions are found in
Appendix D. By noting that the expressions (??)a n d( ??)f o rcy,t−1 and cot are not aﬀected by θ
f
t−1 =0 ,
we show formally that the DC system does not impact individual consumption decisions.




















b dt = b G
y
t. (51)
The generational account of the old generation improves when ωAt > 0 and θ
w
t > 0,
because the young pay more wage-linked PAYG premia. It also improves if b dt > 0 allows
for a lower tax burden on the old generation. With positive nominal public debt (so that
adn > 0), a positive inﬂation shock erodes the value of the nominal assets held by the old,
thereby reducing the generational account of the old and beneﬁting the young tax payers
in period t.
6.1.2 Deﬁned beneﬁts y s t e m s
A deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) type of pension fund allows for additional intergenerational risk
sharing if the assets of the pension fund do not match its liabilities. The generational
accounts then include “correction terms,” which involve the ex-post return diﬀerences
between the liabilities and the assets of the pension fund.9 These correction terms enter
the generational accounts in exactly the same way as dt, since these “debts” are completely
paid oﬀ by the young only; unlike the explicit public debt issued in period t − 1, these
debts are not shared between the young and the old depending on the relative sizes of the
generations.
Depending on the type of pension liability, we distinguish between various types of
deﬁned-beneﬁt systems with, respectively, nominal, real (i.e., price indexed) and wage-
indexed liabilities. The neutrality result for the introduction of a second pillar disappears
under these deﬁned beneﬁt systems. Intuitively, these pension systems introduce new ways
t os h a r er i s k sb e t w e e nt h eg e n e r a t i o n st h a ta r en o to ﬀered by ﬁnancial markets. Hence,
agents can not oﬀset the transactions of the pension fund. To ensure equilibrium in the
asset markets in period t − 1, equilibrium asset returns generally change in response to
changes in the funded pension system.
Deﬁned nominal beneﬁts (DNB) If the liabilities of the pension fund are in nominal
terms, each old person receives a pre-ﬁxed nominal pension beneﬁt θ
fn
t . We refer to this
deﬁned-beneﬁts c h e m ew i t hd e ﬁned nominal beneﬁts as the DNB scheme. Given that the
beneﬁti np e r i o dt is deﬁned in nominal terms, it should be valued in the same way as a
nominal bond. Hence, the relevant discount rate is the nominal interest rate it−1.T h e
system is fully funded if it does not redistribute between the two generations ex ante.
Hence, the old generation should pay in period t − 1 for its pension beneﬁti np e r i o dt.
In other words, the discounted value to the old generation in period t − 1 of the pension
beneﬁte x p e c t e di np e r i o dt should match the pension contribution in period t, θ
f
t−1, so
9The value of these return diﬀerences is zero in period t − 1 (i.e. ex ante) for the old generation
since the discount rates of this generation are used to value pension liabilities when imposing the funding





t /(1 + it−1). Whereas the nominal return on the pension contribution is















T h ef u n d i n gr e q u i r e m e n ti m p l i e st h a tt h eo l da r ei n d i ﬀerent about an additional mar-
ginal contribution into the fund (and the associated additional beneﬁt) since (21) holds,










mt ≡ uc (cot)/uc (cy,t−1),
denotes the stochastic discount rate of the old and mt = uc (cot)/uc (cy,t−1).





t−1, accrues to the young, who
thus absorb the mismatch risk. Each young person in period t receives 1−δ
δ times the value
of the fund per old minus the real value of the old’s nominal beneﬁt (the second equality

























































The ﬁr s tl i n es h o w st h a tt h ey o u n ge ﬀectively issue a nominal bond of size θ
f
t−1 to the
old and invest the resources for their own risk according to the portfolio of the pension
fund. The pension system thus allows the young to participate in the capital market
before they are born and before they accumulate any assets. The young can in fact go
short in nominal assets and long in other assets. In this way, they can share risks with
the old generations. In particular, the young share in depreciation risk if the pension fund
invests in equity (i.e. k
f
t > 0). In this case, the young eﬀectively participate in the stock
market through the deﬁned-beneﬁtp e n s i o nf u n d .A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h ey o u n ga r es h o r t









t > 0). The second line indicates that the mismatch risk is absent if
the pension fund matches its liabilities by investing its entire pension portfolio in nominal








t−1). In that case, the DNB system is equivalent
to a DC system that invests only in nominal bonds. Hence, in the second pillar, the young
are neither short nor long in inﬂation or share-market risk.























































16Appendix D loglinearizes (53) and uses the result to arrive at a reduced form for loglin-
earized consumption.
Deﬁned real beneﬁts (DRB) In a DRB system, the period-t old receive a deﬁned
real beneﬁt θ
fr
t . T h er e a lr e t u r no nt h ep e n s i o nc o n t r i b u t i o ni sn o wd e n o t e dr
fr
t−1. The
funding requirement implies that the pension contribution equals the discounted value of








The funding requirement implies also that the old are indiﬀerent about an additional
marginal contribution into the fund (and the associated additional beneﬁt) since (20)






























































The young in eﬀect issue indexed bonds of size θ
f
t−1 to the old and invest the resources for
their own risk according to the portfolio of the pension fund. This way, the young can in
fact go short in real debt and, depending on the equity investments of the pension fund
k
f
t , they can share equity market risks with the old. Moreover, if the pension fund invests
in nominal assets (i.e. b
nf
t−1 > 0), the young share inﬂation risk. In case the pension fund









young do not bear any mismatch risk. In that case, the DC and DRB systems become
identical for given initial size θ
f
t−1 if the DC scheme invests in real public debt only.
Mismatch risk is thus necessary for the young to share in the equity market and inﬂation
risk.





















































Appendix D linearizes (55) and ﬁnds a reduced form for loglinearized consumption of the
old and the young in period t.
17Deﬁned wage-indexed beneﬁt( D W B ) With deﬁned wage-indexed beneﬁts, the
pension beneﬁt is indexed to the wage rate (the DWB system). In that case, the beneﬁt





















t−1 represents the real return on each euro of contribution in period t − 1.
The system is fully funded if the old pay at the margin the value they attach to the








, which by using (56)
to eliminate r
fw











FLt¯ LEt−1 [uc (cot)At]. (57)













t−1, each one of































































Under the DWB system, the young in eﬀect issue a wage-indexed bond to the old and
invest the borrowed resources in indexed and nominal bonds and physical capital, conform
the portfolio decisions of the pension fund (see (48)). Wage risk is not traded in ﬁnancial
markets10 so that the DWB pension fund always suﬀers from mismatch risk. In a way, the
pension fund introduces new possibilities for implicitly trading risk factors. In particular,
DWB pensions funds allow the young generations not only to participate in the equity
market but also to shed wage risk. When pension liabilities depend on non-traded risk
factors, the valuation of pension liabilities typically becomes problematic and diverges
between various agents. For the valuation of non-traded wage-indexed pension liabilities,
see De Jong (2005). By using the stochastic discount factor of the old generation to value
liabilities, we in eﬀect employ the valuation of the old generations in imposing the funding
requirement.



























































10Trade in equity allows only a particular combination of productivity and depreciation risk to be
traded.
18Appendix D linearizes (58) and uses the result to ﬁnd a reduced form for loglinearized
consumption levels in period t.
7 Optimal pension arrangements
This section studies how the decentralized market economy can replicate the social opti-
mum with an appropriate choice of the pension system. The following proposition gives
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the replication of the social optimum:
Proposition 1 When a policy produces uc (cot)=χpuc (cyt) for all possible realizations of
the shock vector ξt and the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, then the
competitive equilibrium reproduces the socially-optimal allocation under all types of funded
pension systems.
Proof. Add δ times equation (31) and (1 − δ) times equation (32). Using rkn
t =
AtFKt − ζt and (33), the resulting equation can be simpliﬁed to (4), which for given Kt
coincides with the planner’s resource constraint. The combination of (a) the expression
uc (cot)=χpuc (cyt), which in the proposition holds by assumption, (b) expression (4), (c)
equation (22), and (d) equation (30) exactly coincides with the system (3), (4), (6) and
(7) to be solved under the planner. Hence, the decentralized economy is solved for the
same combination(s) {cy,t−1,c yt,c ot,K t} as in the social planner’s problem.







t are not contingent on the shocks. Although the potential objections to making
these parameters dependent on the shocks are not modelled explicitly, frequent changes
in the pension parameters inevitably lead to political struggles and introduce additional
uncertainty not directly linked to the fundamental economic shocks themselves.
7.1 Optimum with equally-weighted generations (χp =1 )
This sub-section assumes that the two generations are weighted equally in social welfare
(i.e. χp =1 ) . This particular case is of special interest because it allows for simple and
intuitive analytical solutions, without having to resort to loglinearizations.
With χp =1 , the necessary and suﬃcient condition in Proposition 1 for reproducing
the social optimum reduces to cyt = cot. Hence, by (31) and (32), the social optimum is























Kt, exceeds individual wage income, 1
δAtFLt¯ L, then the old would
have more resources for consumption in period t than the young if the generational ac-
counts are zero so that intergenerational transfers are absent. To ensure cyt = cot,t h e
19generational accounts should oﬀset these diﬀerences in individual incomes between the
generations. To illustrate, an increase in depreciation, which under laissez-faire reduces
only the resources of the old, requires an decrease (increase) in the generational account
of the young (old) so that the young also share in this adverse shock.
Substituting the expressions for the generational accounts under the various pension
fund systems, we can show how the policy parameters should be set to reproduce the social
optimum. For the DC system, substituting (50) into (59), the requirement for reproducing





































Replication of the social optimum requires that this expression hold for all possible real-
izations of the shock vector ξt. If at all possible, this imposes certain restrictions on the
pension system.
Similarly, for the DNB system, substitution of (53) into (59) yields the following re-





























































This expression diﬀers from (60) by its second line.





























































Hence, this expression also diﬀers from (60) by its second line.


































































20In theory, a shock-contingent debt policy dt can always produce the social optimum.
In reality, however, public debt policies are typically restricted, for example, in view of
supranational agreements like under Europe’s Stability and Growth Pact (see Beetsma and
Uhlig, 1999, and Beetsma and Debrun, 2006). Even in the absence of such restrictions,
ex-post ﬁne-tuning of the resources of the two generations through debt policy is diﬃcult
from a practical point of view. For the remainder of this section we therefore assume that
dt is not contingent on shocks.
By inspecting (60), we immediately see that:
Proposition 2 A DC funded system can not replicate the social optimum for arbitrary
realizations of the shock vector ξt.
For the DC system, replication of the social optimum fails on several accounts. By
its very nature, the pension system does not allow the young to acquire a claim on the
net-of-depreciation return on capital. Hence, the young do not share in depreciation risks
ζt. Furthermore, the young do not hold a claim on nominal debt. Hence, the old can not
shed the inﬂation risk of holding nominal bonds if dn
t−1 > 0.
The other funded systems can all be designed so as to achieve the social optimum.
The following proposition makes this more precise:
Proposition 3 An appropriate combination of the two pension pillars can replicate the
social optimum.
In particular, with a DRB or DNB fund in the second pillar, the following arrange-
ments achieve this. The ﬁrst pension pillar implements optimal ex-ante redistribution








(Kt + gt−1) and a wage-linked PAYG pension premium θ
w
t =1−δ.T h e
second pension pillar provides for the optimal ex-post redistribution of productivity, depre-

























With a DWB fund, the ﬁrst pension pillar provides for the appropriate ex-ante redistribu-















t =0 . The second pension pillar provides for the optimal ex-post sharing of productiv-
ity, depreciation and inﬂation risks with θ
dw









Proof. Follows directly by substitution of the proposed arrangements into (62), (61)
and (63), respectively, and making use of (23), (24) and (48).




1−δKt.B y h a v i n g a d e ﬁned-beneﬁt pension fund to invest part of its assets in equity
capital, the young share in the depreciation risk that would otherwise be solely borne by
the old. The share of the pension portfolio invested in equity capital is determined by
21the requirement that each agent bears the same depreciation risk. In particular, if the
young generation is relatively larger (δ is larger), the proportion of total capital held by
the fund rises as the depreciation risk has to be shifted towards a larger young generation












t + k)=( 1− δ). In other words, the share of capital
held by the old is equal to its population share, so that each individual eﬀectively (directly
or indirectly as a residual claimant to the pension fund) holds exactly the same amount
of capital. The condition kt/k
f
t =( 1 − δ)/δ in eﬀect determines the optimal share of
DC pensions relatively to DB pensions.11 We see that in a more aged society (i.e., δ is
becoming small), the DC part of the second pension pillar should be larger. Intuitively,
with a relatively small young generation, the old can shed less capital risk. This result
may help to explain the trend away from DB to DC pension systems in aging societies.
The pension arrangements also share wage risks. By setting θ
w
t =1− δ under the
DNB and DRB funds and θ
dw
t = δ under the DWB scheme, the human capital claims
eﬀectively held by the old versus the young coincide with their population shares. Hence,
each individual has exactly the same exposure to not only depreciation risk but also human
capital risk. The pension system thus allows the old to get rid of depreciation risk and
the young to shed wage risk.
As regards inﬂation risks, the DRB and DWB systems require the pension fund to




t−1.R e c a l lt h a tb
nf
t−1 is the amount of nominal
bonds in the pension fund per old person. Hence, (1 − δ)b
nf
t−1 = δdn
t−1 is the total amount
of nominal bonds in the pension fund, which is eﬀectively held by the young generation
as a whole. The young generation thus eﬀectively holds a share δ of the overall stock of
nominal assets dn
t−1, which coincides with its population share δ. Each person thus has the
same exposure to inﬂation risk through nominal asset holdings. Inﬂation then does not
redistribute across generations because each person pays the same amount of taxes and
thus beneﬁts in the same way from the erosion of the real value of debt service as a result
of inﬂation. An unexpected increase in inﬂation leaves all agents unaﬀected: the decline
in the real value of their nominal asset holdings is exactly oﬀset by lower tax payments
on account of a decline in public debt service.
By deﬁning its pension liabilities to the old generation in nominal terms, the DNB
system increases the exposure of the old generation to inﬂation risks. Investments in
nominal assets by the DNB fund then have to ensure that the young not only share the
inﬂation risk implied by nominal public debt dn
t−1 but also take over the inﬂation risk
implied by the nominal nature of the funded pension beneﬁts. A DNB fund thus must





t−1/(1 − δ).T h e
large long position of the fund in nominal debt and the positive investment in equity, which
ensures the correct exposure of the young to depreciation risk, imply that the fund has to
11Recall that members of the old generation are indiﬀerent between a physical capital investment kt
via a deﬁned contribution pension fund or just directly investing themselves in physical capital.
22go short in real debt. Indeed, the short position in real debt b
rf
t−1 = − δ
1−δ(Kt+dn
t−1) is the
counterpart of the required exposure of the young to inﬂation risk (which is associated
with nominal public debt dn
t−1) and depreciation risk. Hence, a DNB pension fund can
replicate the social optimum only if short-selling constraints are absent.
Let us now turn to optimal intergenerational ex-ante redistribution established by the








(Kt + gt−1) and θ
w
t =1− δ. θ
w
t ensures that the old get the
appropriate implicit claim on human capital, whereas θ
p
t ensures that the young obtain the
correct implicit claim on economy-wide saving in period t−1. With a fully funded second
pillar, the young on average do not have a claim on saving in period t − 1. To establish
equal consumption of all individuals in period t, the PAYG system thus has to ensure
that the two generations share not only human capital but also the claims on capital and
public resources.
With a DWB system, the parameter θ
p
t has to establish both the correct average share
of the young on saving as the correct average share of the old on human capital. The
DWB system does not require systematic redistribution to the old through the wage-
indexed component of the PAYG system. As a result, the lump-sum component of the
PAYG system should include an extra systematic transfer from the young to the old. By







, from an ex-ante perspective, gross











,w a g ei n c o m ei np e r i o dt is spread equally over
all individuals. Hence, consumption levels are equalized from an ex ante perspective.
We can conclude that an optimal funding arrangement ensures that all individuals in
society, young or old, hold the same claims on human capital, physical capital and nominal
assets. Under DRB and DNB systems, the ﬁrst pillar of the pension system provides for
both ex-ante redistribution and some risk sharing. With a DWB system, in contrast, these
two roles of the pension system can be completely separated. The ﬁrst, PAYG pillar can
be targetted exclusively at optimal ex ante redistribution, while the second, funded pillar
is responsible for optimal risk sharing.
7.2 Optimum with diverging generational weights (χp 6=1 )
With diverging generational weights (i.e. χp 6=1 ) , replication of the social optimum in
a decentralized economy is established in two steps. First, the median solution of the
decentralized economy needs to coincide with that under the social planner. Given the
values of the potential other parameters of the pension arrangement, one can set the lump-
sum component of the ﬁrst pillar of the pension system, θ
p
t, such that the system (3), (8),
(9) and (10) is fulﬁlled. In this way, the ﬁrst pillar establishes the appropriate amount of
intergenerational redistribution. Second, the responses of the pension policies need to be
such that (11) holds. Under χp =1 ,w eh a v et h a t¯ cyt =¯ cot and, hence, σo = σy,s ot h a t
b cyt = b cot. In the more general case where χp diﬀers from 1 and thus ¯ cyt and ¯ cot diﬀer from
23each other, we still have that b cyt = b cot if the felicity function features constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) so that σo = σy is constant. Without constant relative risk aversion, σo
and σy may deviate from each other so that the optimal logdeviations of consumptions of
the old and young diﬀer from each other according to b cyt =( σo/σy)b cot.




˜ acoaL − ˜ acyaKn
˜ aco +˜ acy
ωAt +
˜ acy
˜ aco +˜ acy
aζωζt, (64)
where ˜ acy ≡ acy/σy and ˜ aco ≡ aco/σo.Under each of our pension systems, b Go
t behaves
in a diﬀe r e n tw a y . W ee x p l o r eo n l yt h et h r e et y p e so fD Bs y s t e m sb e c a u s ew ea l r e a d y
established that the DC pension system was not able to replicate the social optimum with
χp =1 .
Proposition 4 (1) Consider a two-pillar pension system with a DRB second pillar. By
setting θ
w
t =1 /(1 + ˜ acy/˜ aco) and k
f
t =( ˜ acy/˜ aco)Kt/[(1 − δ)(1+˜ acy/˜ aco)],w es i m u l t a n e -
ously achieve optimal risk-sharing of ωAt and ωζt shocks. In addition, inﬂation risks are
















t−1, and otherwise keeping the arrangement the
same as under (1), the social optimum is replicated.






t =1 /(1 + ˜ acy/˜ aco) and otherwise keeping the arrangement the same as under (1), the
social optimum is replicated.
Proof. See Appendix E.
This proposition generalizes Proposition 3 to the case χp 6=1 .I f χp =1 , ¯ cyt =¯ cot
and thus σy = σo and ˜ acy/˜ aco = δ/(1 − δ). In that case, arrangement (3) in Proposition





t =1− δ, k
f
t = δKt/(1 − δ) and b
nf
t−1 = δdn
t−1/(1 − δ),w h i c hi s
exactly the corresponding arrangement proposed in Proposition 3 when θ
w
t =0 . Similarly,
we can see that arrangements (1) and (2) in Proposition 4 reduce to the corresponding
arrangements in Proposition 3.












(1 − δ)(¯ cot/σo)















For the moment, suppose that σy = σo. If the social welfare weight on the young is
relatively large (i.e. χp > 1),w eh a v e¯ cyt > ¯ cot and θ
w






12The intuitions are very similar for arrangements (1) and (2) and are, therefore, not explicitly described.
24and (1−δ)k
f
t >δ K t. The young thus obtain a larger claim on human capital and ﬁnancial
capital than their population share δ and thus bear a larger share of the risks associated
with human and ﬁnancial capital. Intuitively, the young are richer and thus absorb a





t has to be adjusted accordingly. If in addition the old are more risk averse than the
young (σo >σ y), the young obtain an even larger claim on human and ﬁnancial capital







t ) so that they bear a larger share of the aggregate risks. To
prevent the old becoming poorer on average, the government has to adjust θ
p
t so that the
old collect relatively more safe income.
A wage-linked ﬁrst PAYG pillar is required (i.e. θ
w
t 6=0 )u n l e s sw eh a v eaD W B
second pillar. The reason is that depreciation and productivity risks imply independent
wage and capital risks. Accordingly, all generations must have an implicit claim on both
human capital and equity capital to optimally share these risks. Without a wage-linked




t =0 ), the old do not have a claim on human capital
and thus do not share in wage risks. The overall optimal exposure of the old to wage risk





t is given by
δ(¯ cot/σo)
δ(¯ cyt/σy)+(1−δ)(¯ cot/σo).
In contrast to productivity and depreciation risks, inﬂation risk is not an aggregate risk.
Hence, it can be completely eliminated with the social welfare weight χp and diﬀerences
in risk aversion not aﬀecting the optimal allocation. Through the pension fund holding
nominal bonds, each young person holds the same amount of nominal bonds as an old
person.14 Since each person pays the same amount of taxes and thus beneﬁts in the
same way from lower debt service as a result of unexpected inﬂation eroding the real
value of nominal bonds, nobody is exposed to inﬂation risk. With unanticipated inﬂation,
lower tax payments exactly compensate for a lower real value of (eﬀective) nominal bond
holdings.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper investigated how diﬀerent pension arrangements aﬀect intergenerational risk
sharing in a three-period overlapping generations model. The two generations in the model
overlap only during the middle period. As a result, risks cannot be directly traded be-
tween the two generations, thereby creating a rationale for institutions that take over this
role. In particular, the combination of a ﬁrst PAYG pension pillar aimed at intergenera-
tional redistribution and a second, funded deﬁned-beneﬁt pension pillar aimed at sharing
ﬁnancial market, wage and inﬂation risks can achieve the social optimum.
This paper has focussed on the role of the pension system in conducting intergenera-
13Our ﬁnding of b cyt = b cot combined with ¯ cyt > ¯ cot implies that the ﬂuctuations, as a result of shocks,




t−1/(1 − δ) implies (1 − δ)b
nf
t−1 = δdn
t−1. Hence, the aggregate nominal bonds holdings of
the pension fund (1 − δ)b
nf
t−1 equal a share δ of the total amount of nominal bonds in the economy. Hence,
the young hold an aggregate share of nominal bonds that corresponds to their population share.
25tional risk sharing. An alternative instrument for intergenerational risk sharing is ﬁscal
policy. In our model, the scope for optimal risk sharing through ﬁscal policy is rather
limited. With a richer menu of taxes, ﬁscal policy can play a larger role in optimal risk
sharing. To illustrate, taxes on labor and capital income may help to optimally share
productivity and depreciation risks across generations. At the same time, however, ﬁscal
discretion may give rise to other, political risks. This may in fact further increase the role
of the pension system in optimal intergenerational risk sharing.
Our paper allows for a large number of further extensions. First, the menu of shocks
could be extended to include, for example demographic shocks (such as shocks to fertil-
ity and longevity — see, for example, Auerbach and Hassett, 2002, and Andersen, 2005)
and health shocks. A second extension would be to incorporate discretionary monetary
policy endogenously determining inﬂation. Indeed, monetary policy provides another po-
tential instrument for optimal risk sharing. However, the potential beneﬁcial role for
discretionary monetary policy in conducting risk sharing has to weighed against potential
political risks in conducting monetary policy. As a third extension, we can allow for in-
tragenerational heterogeneity in risk preferences. In that case, mandatory pension funds
with uniform investments and liabilities are not able to tailor to individual preferences. If
young individuals do not have access to ﬁnancial markets to construct their own tailor-
made portfolio, mandatory pension funds may give rise to welfare losses compared to a
ﬁrst-best world in which all individuals can buy their own tailor-made portfolio. These
losses have to be traded oﬀ against the potential beneﬁts of pension funds in allowing
young generations to share in ﬁnancial-market risks.
We have assumed that the young cannot participate in capital markets at all to share
ﬁnancial-market risks. One interpretation is that human capital is not tradable and that
the young therefore cannot borrow at all against their human capital to invest in ﬁnancial
capital. In practice, however, the young may be able to participate in equity-market
risk that materializes during their working career, either by borrowing or by investing
all their saving in the risk-bearing capital. Indeed, capital markets allow in principle
for risk-sharing between overlapping generations, especially if the young can borrow. In
this regard, our calculations thus are likely to overstate the potential risk-sharing beneﬁts
from deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans. At the same time, however, by modelling only two
generations, we have underestimated the potential gains of pension funds from risksharing
between non-overlapping generations. Indeed, with many non-overlapping generations, old
generations can beneﬁt from sharing risks with not only the young generations that they
overlap with but also future generations that are not yet born when they are alive (see
Van Hemert, 2006). In other words, it may pay to allow not only the young generation
but also other future generations to trade with the old through the pension system. We
would like to explore how sensitive our results are with respect to alternative assumptions
about the extent to which the young and the future generations can participate in capital
markets and pension institutions. Whereas more scope for the young to participate in
26capital markets reduces the value-added of pension funds, including more generations in
pension arrangements increases the potential of pension funds to create value by opening
up new ways to conduct intergenerational risk sharing.
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Notice that acy +aco+ag =1 .W ed e ﬁne the share of output (aY), capital providers (aK),
the net share of capital providers (aKn), the depreciation share (aζ) and the share of labor
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